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International Tax Disputes: Between Supranational Administration and 
Adjudication 
 
Sol Picciotto 
 
 
Summary 
 
The proposals resulting from the G20/Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) include a drive for 
mandatory binding arbitration of international tax disputes, strongly supported by business. 
This issue should be considered in the context of the reasons for and nature of international 
tax disputes. The bulk of such conflicts concern ‘economic’ double taxation, resulting from 
divergent interpretations by different tax authorities of the standards for attributing profits to 
affiliates within a corporate group, so that the firm as a whole may be taxed on more than 
100 per cent of its worldwide profit. Such divergences result from transfer pricing rules that 
treat the affiliates within a TNC group as if they were an independent entity dealing ‘at arm’s 
length’ with each other, and requiring subjective judgements by each tax authority on the 
profits attributable to each. Hence, it is not surprising that the number of such conflicts has 
grown steadily, especially in the past decade, as countries have applied the rules more 
vigorously. Arbitration has been advocated not because it can provide objective adjudication, 
but as a fall-back in order to pressurise tax authorities to resolve cases by negotiation rather 
than submitting to a third party decision. In fact, although binding arbitration has been 
available among European Union (EU) members as well as some other states since 1990, 
only a handful of the continually growing number of conflict cases have actually been 
referred to arbitration. The newer approach of ‘last best offer’ (LBO) arbitration, widely 
regarded as more successful, aims to pressurise tax authorities to give up positions that are 
likely to be considered unorthodox. The Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP), including 
arbitration, is essentially a supranational administrative procedure for coordination of the 
application of international tax rules. Its improvement should form part of a wider process of 
reform of both the institutions and the substantive rules of international taxation. 
 
Keywords: international tax; multinationals; disputes; mutual agreement procedure; transfer 
pricing. 
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Introduction: the current context 
 
The final outputs of the G20/OECD project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), 
published on 5 October 2015, included Action 14: Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
More Effective. Improving the procedures for resolving international tax disputes was 
regarded as a key issue during the consultations, especially by tax advisers for transnational 
corporations (TNCs), who are the persons mainly affected by the BEPS project.1 The 
project’s main outputs are proposals for measures which, once implemented, would 
considerably strengthen the powers of tax authorities to combat the tax avoidance 
techniques that have become increasingly prevalent among TNCs. Although these measures 
will be to some extent coordinated, their implementation in national law will inevitably leave 
scope for divergent interpretations. Also, many of the proposals will result in highly complex 
rules, which will leave considerable scope for discretion and subjective judgement.2 
Understandably, therefore, corporate tax advisers are fearful that they will lead to an 
increase in inconsistent, and perhaps conflicting, decisions, and hence excessive tax claims 
by states, or ‘double taxation’ (OECD 2015b). 
 
It was due to these fears that corporate tax advisers strongly advocated a system of 
mandatory binding arbitration (MBA) of tax disputes in the consultations on BEPS project 
proposals (OECD 2015b). This echoed pressure made from the very beginning of the 
international tax treaty system by business representatives for some form of adjudication to 
resolve conflicting claims to tax.3 Governments long resisted a binding obligation to resolve 
claims of international double taxation by arbitration (OECD 1984); some became favourable 
to the idea in the 1990s, and the momentum for it has increased. On this occasion, it was 
supported by a number of the governmental representatives involved in the BEPS project, 
although no consensus could be reached (OECD 2015a). Agreement was achieved on a set 
of minimum standards and best practices, compliance with which will be monitored through 
an Inclusive Framework covering all states (see Section 3.1 below). 
 
In addition, a significant group, comprising twenty states, did make a commitment to 
establish mandatory binding arbitration, although its form is still to be agreed.4 Negotiations 
have begun on a scheme as part of the multilateral instrument proposed under BEPS Action 
15.5 It remains to be seen what form of arbitration could be agreed upon, and its relationship 
to existing arrangements, notably the multilateral tax arbitration convention among EU states, 
                                                 
1  An excellent source for the views of business groups, tax advisers, and specific companies is the comments sent to the 
OECD on BEPS Action 14 (OECD 2015b); all but four were from such sources, and they were unanimous in urging 
adoption of binding arbitration. The following comment from the Business and Industry Advisory Council was 
representative: ‘Binding arbitration is a critical part of any solution... we ask all countries involved in the BEPS process 
to recognize that adopting a binding and universal arbitration framework should be an integral and inseparable part of 
the BEPS deliverables.’ (OECD 2015b: 42). The same view was strongly urged by almost all participants at the public 
consultation on 23 January 2015, attended by the author (webcast available at <video.oecd.org>, accessed 15 July 
2016). 
2  For further details see Picciotto (2016), especially Section 4. 
3  e.g. by the British National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce in 1935: see Picciotto (1992: 284), 
and source there cited. Altman (2005) provides a more detailed history.  
4  Twenty were mentioned in the Action 14 report: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The Action 14 report stressed that the 20 making the commitment are involved in over 
90% of tax disputes reported to the OECD at the end of 2013, but they are nevertheless only a third of the states 
participating in the BEPS process. They did not include the following 14 OECD members: Chile, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Portugal, Slovak Republic and Turkey; the 
two OECD ‘candidate states’ which have participated in the BEPS process (Colombia, Latvia); any of the 8 non-OECD 
G20 members involved in the BEPS project (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South 
Africa); nor the 14 developing countries which had also been allowed to join the project (Albania, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Croatia, Georgia, Jamaica, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Tunisia, and Viet Nam).  
5  Some 94 governments were represented in the inaugural meeting of the Ad Hoc Group for negotiation of this instrument 
held on 5-6 November 2015 at the OECD in Paris, at which a sub-group was established to work on MBA. The 
Instrument is expected to be published in the autumn of 2016. It will not be a substantive treaty, but a kind of multilateral 
protocol to amend existing treaties. 
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and dispute resolution provisions in bilateral tax treaties. Over 200 of these now include 
some form of arbitration (see Appendix, Table 8), although the vast majority do not. It seems 
that the intention is to include a common arbitration provision in the multilateral convention 
that will facilitate its introduction into existing bilateral treaties, as well as the other changes 
agreed in the BEPS process. However, it is not clear whether the states that are committed 
to arbitration will insist on the inclusion of that provision as the price their treaty partners must 
pay for introducing other changes. 
 
This move towards more formalised procedures for resolution of international tax disputes is 
in many respects controversial,6 and raises a number of interesting questions. Arbitration of 
international tax disputes has been rejected by developing countries, including key ones 
such as Brazil, China and India, although it was included as an option in the UN model in 
2011.7 The UN Committee of Experts in Tax Matters agreed in October 2015 to set up a 
subcommittee to examine dispute resolution, but it was stressed that it would not focus only 
on arbitration.  
 
The emergence of this issue in the area of tax also invites comparison with the development 
of adjudication procedures to resolve disputes in other areas of international economic 
regulation, especially the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
and arbitration under international investment agreements, both bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and regional (especially the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)). 
 
However, it is important to consider the issue in the context of the nature of international tax 
rules and an understanding of the characteristics of conflicts over their application. The bulk 
of such conflicts concern economic double taxation, especially resulting from divergent 
application of transfer pricing rules by different tax authorities to the taxable profits of 
different affiliates within the same TNC corporate group. Such divergences may mean that 
the group as a whole is taxed on more than 100 per cent of its consolidated profits. This is 
the inevitable result of transfer pricing rules that treat the affiliates within a TNC group as if 
they were independent entities dealing with each other at arm’s length, while allowing 
adjustment of their accounts by different tax authorities. Since the methods for such 
adjustments are based on subjective and discretionary judgements, it is not surprising that 
the number of such disputes has grown steadily, especially in the past decade as countries 
have applied these rules more rigorously.  
 
Arbitration has been advocated not in order to settle disputes by independent and principled 
adjudication, but to pressurise tax authorities to settle claims themselves through private 
administrative procedures.8 All but a handful of cases are resolved by negotiation rather than 
submitting to a third party decision. In fact, although binding arbitration has been available 
among EU members and between some other states for over twenty years, and despite the 
continually growing number of cases, only half a dozen have ever actually been referred to 
arbitrators (see below). The newer approach initiated by the US since 2006 of last best offer 
(LBO) arbitration explicitly prohibits the third party adjudicator from providing an independent 
reasoned opinion. This suggests that arbitration is a palliative for the symptoms rather than a 
cure for the ills of the international tax system. 
 
This paper aims to contribute to this important debate on how to improve resolution of 
international tax disputes. It will begin by outlining the context and development of 
                                                 
6  See the comments on the Action 14 Discussion Draft by four civil society organisations (the BEPS Monitoring Group, 
Christian Aid, Global Financial Integrity and the Trade Union Advisory Committee) in OECD (2015b). 
7  The arguments of members of the UN Committee for and against arbitration were included in the Commentary to the 
2011 UN Model Convention: 368-370, although without attribution. No developing country was among the 20 listed as 
accepting a commitment to MBA in the Action 14 report (see Footnote 4 above).  
8  This was evident in both the written comments from business and representations made at the public consultation, cited 
in Footnote 1 above. 
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international tax dispute resolution, then will analyse its nature in a comparative context, and 
conclude with some suggestions for both the current policy debates and the future.  
 
 
1  Tax treaty application and dispute resolution 
 
1.1 Tax treaty principles and the effect of divergent interpretations 
 
Tax treaties have a dual effect. Although they are agreements between states, they also 
affect individual legal persons, especially corporations. Indeed, they are a remarkable, if 
under-appreciated, example of the creation of ‘hard’ rules of international law that are not 
only binding on states, but also in practice have direct legal effects for individuals and 
(mainly) corporations. Tax treaty provisions are incorporated directly into domestic law in 
most countries, by one means or another.9 This means that they create rights that are 
directly enforceable in national law for the taxpayers to whom they apply. These are persons 
or entities with income from activities involving a presence in more than one country, the 
most prominent being TNCs. In effect, they create a special tax regime that is overlaid on the 
normal national rules of taxation of corporate income or profits. 
 
The aim of tax treaties is not to harmonise the laws of the contracting states, but to 
coordinate them as far as possible. Essentially, they agree an allocation of taxation rights 
between the state parties. Their intended purposes were both to prevent double taxation and 
‘fiscal evasion’. In practice, however, priority has been given to the former, since the primary 
aim has been seen as to encourage international investment. States have also treated the 
rights allocated as including a right not to tax – that is, to grant tax exemptions and 
inducements. For their part, TNCs have encouraged this tax competition, and have created 
and exploited loopholes in the system. It is only recently that significant concerns have 
emerged over tax avoidance, or ‘double non-taxation’, which has been the target of the 
BEPS project (Picciotto 2016).  
 
Thus, divergences in the interpretation of treaty provisions affect both governments and 
taxpayers, but in different ways. Some divergences create loopholes, and so may benefit 
taxpayers. Indeed, many tax avoidance techniques are designed to exploit such gaps, and 
hence undermine government revenue. An example are the differences under the laws of 
treaty partner states in the treatment of ‘hybrid’ legal entities or instruments, which were the 
target of Action 2 of the BEPS project. This type of divergence does not involve double 
taxation, but may rather result in double non-taxation. For example, a financial instrument 
may be treated as a loan in the borrower’s country so that the interest is deductible, but as 
equity in the lender’s state so that the payment is treated as a dividend and not taxed. Such 
divergences are not formally conflicts. Treaties do provide procedures for consultation to try 
to resolve such interpretive divergences (discussed in Section 1.2.1 below), but they have 
been used infrequently.  
 
Taxpayers are clearly more concerned when divergent interpretations lead to conflicting tax 
claims, or double taxation. It is these that have been the main focus of efforts to improve 
procedures for dispute resolution. Here, it is necessary also to consider the distinction 
between ‘juridical’ and ‘economic’ double taxation. The former occurs when the same legal 
person is taxed twice on the same income, and the latter when the same income flow is 
                                                 
9  In some countries (e.g. Germany, USA) ratification of a treaty requires legislative approval, upon which it becomes part 
of domestic law, although the creation of rights for legal persons depends on whether the provisions are regarded as 
‘self-executing’ (which is the case for tax treaties). In others implementation is by legislation: e.g. in the UK this occurs 
virtually automatically, as they need only be presented to parliament for approval as subsidiary legislation (Orders in 
Council), under the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 (TIOPA), s. 2. In this respect, tax treaties are 
different from trade or investment agreements, for example.  
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taxed in the hands of two different legal persons (OECD-CTPA 2007, para. 1.1.2). Juridical 
double taxation could occur, for example, due to a disagreement over the characterisation of 
an item of a person’s income. A classic case concerned payments made to the musician 
Pierre Boulez for conducting recorded orchestral performances in New York: these were 
treated in the US as fees for personal services and hence taxable in the US, but as royalties 
and hence taxable also in Germany where he was resident.10 In relation to TNCs, examples 
of juridical double taxation are differences over the country of residence of an entity, or over 
whether a company resident in one country has a taxable presence (a permanent 
establishment) in another. 
 
However, most transfer pricing disputes concern economic double taxation, and the rapid 
increase in conflicts, especially over the past decade, has been due mainly to such allocation 
cases. Such divergences result inevitably from the ‘independent entity’ principle which has 
become increasingly entrenched.11 Under this approach, each tax authority must start from 
the tax accounts of the local affiliates of a TNC. Transfer pricing rules allow these accounts 
to be adjusted, but by comparing the prices for transactions between the affiliates in different 
countries with comparable transactions between unrelated entities. Unfortunately, however, 
appropriate comparables do not exist.12 Although there are frequent complaints of lack of 
data on appropriate comparables, the underlying reason is the very nature of TNCs as 
integrated firms, benefiting from the advantages of synergy and economies of scale and 
scope. For these reasons, the profitability of affiliates of a multinational enterprise will 
generally be much higher than that of a self-standing firm in the same line of business. Yet, 
methodologies for evaluation of comparability mainly focus on identifying an appropriate 
profit margin, based on comparison with such self-standing firms. Either such firms just do 
not exist, because of the oligopolistic dominance of TNCs, or they are not truly comparable. 
Furthermore, the methods require identification of the functions performed, assets employed 
and risks assumed by each entity. This involves analysis of the specific facts and 
circumstances of each firm’s business model, and judgements that are inherently subjective 
and discretionary. Hence, it is not surprising that, with increasingly stringent enforcement of 
transfer pricing rules, there has been a growth in conflicting interpretations. 
 
In this context, it is easy to understand both the pressure from TNCs and their tax advisers 
for harmonised application of the rules, and the reluctance of many tax authorities to accept 
an obligation to ensure this. However, the position of most TNC tax advisers is self-
contradictory. On the one hand, they generally insist on the strict application of the 
independent entity principle, so that each affiliate is taxed separately, even if that results in 
taxation of less than 100 per cent of the consolidated profits of the group as a whole. 
Nevertheless, they demand a guarantee of no double taxation of those consolidated group 
profits. The governments’ position is more logical: under the independent entity approach, 
their concern is to ensure that the entities within their jurisdiction declare an appropriate level 
of taxable profits. As the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines state ‘transfer pricing is not an 
exact science but does require the exercise of judgement’ (OECD 2010: para. 1.13). Hence, 
it is not surprising that governments have been unwilling to guarantee to resolve all conflicts 
caused by divergent interpretations, especially those which apply to different taxpayers that 
are supposed to be treated as independent entities. 
 
  
                                                 
10  Discussed in Picciotto (1992: 289); the case was taken up by the competent authorities but they failed to agree, though 
it seems that the German authority eventually allowed a credit for the US tax paid. 
11  For a brief history and analysis see Picciotto (2013). 
12  A notable occasion when this was frankly recognised occurred during the consultations in the BEPS process on ‘special 
measures’ (19 March 2015), when the Chinese delegate (Xiaoyue Wang, deputy director-general in the International 
Taxation Department) forthrightly stated that ‘the arm’s length principle does not work’, because in her experience true 
comparables cannot be found (see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hjuhPtmTx64&feature=youtu.be>). 
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1.2 The Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) 
 
Tax treaties include several provisions to facilitate coordination of their application. Article 26 
provides for Exchange of Information and Mutual Assistance, and Article 25 establishes a 
Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP). These are essentially of an administrative nature, 
based on direct contact between tax authorities through a competent authority. Article 25 
specifies that the competent authority (CA) of each state should endeavour to resolve, if 
necessary by mutual agreement, any difficulties caused by divergent interpretations of their 
provisions. The obligation is to seek a solution, not necessarily to find one. The MAP 
involves two kinds of situation: general issues of interpretation, and individual cases. For 
both the procedure is between the tax authorities; indeed, the term in French for the MAP is 
the ‘amicable procedure’. However, the taxpayer is given a right under the treaty to initiate an 
individual case, by applying to a tax authority.13  
 
This procedure for access to dispute resolution in international tax cases may be compared 
and contrasted to those for trade and investment conflicts. Like tax, conflicts over trade rules 
are generally treated as between governments, notably under WTO agreements. However, 
the main trading states (including the EU, Japan and the US) have also created internal 
procedures for legal persons to bring complaints of unfair trade practices, which may lead to 
an international complaint (Picciotto 2005). This indirect procedure is similar to that of the 
MAP for tax cases. Bilateral investment treaties, on the other hand, commonly provide a 
direct right for an investor to demand arbitration of a claim against a state for breach of their 
provisions. However, this investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) procedure has become 
controversial, and is now very much in flux (UNCTAD 2013, 2015, and see Section 2.3 
below).  
 
1.2.1 Interpretive mutual agreements 
 
Both the OECD and the UN model conventions provide for the competent authorities to 
‘endeavour to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the 
interpretation or application of the Convention’ (Article 25.3). This procedure clearly applies 
to difficulties resulting in either double taxation or double non-taxation, and hence could be 
very helpful in ensuring effective working of treaty rules. 
  
In practice, the provision has been used relatively rarely. Tax officials certainly now have 
many opportunities for contact and discussion, but these generally have an informal 
character. To the extent that such contacts require a legal umbrella, they are regarded as 
taking place under the information exchange powers of Article 26. The more formal 
procedure envisaged by the Article 25.3 provision raises problems of interaction between 
international and domestic law. Since tax treaties generally take direct effect in national law, 
as explained above, it is considered in many countries that domestic courts have the primary 
right and responsibility to interpret them, especially as their provisions may interact with other 
domestic rules.14 This difficulty applies even more strongly to the additional possibility 
provided in the second sentence of paragraph 25.3, to ‘consult together for the elimination of 
double taxation in cases not provided for in the Convention’. This broad discretionary power 
could be read as giving tax authorities virtually legislative authority to deal with issues 
beyond the specific provisions of the treaty itself. Hence, this sentence is frequently omitted 
in actual treaties. 
 
                                                 
13  This may be either to the authority making the disputed decision, or to that in the country of residence of the related 
affiliate (in a treaty partner) that would suffer double taxation as a result of the decision. 
14  Picciotto (1992: 295-299). This conflict may be less acute in some countries – notably, in France treaty interpretation is 
considered to be an ‘acte du gouvernement’, and courts may refer a term requiring interpretation to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
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A general interpretive mutual agreement can take a variety of forms, ranging from an 
Exchange of Notes or a Memorandum of Understanding, to no more than an informal 
statement of intention between administrative authorities. No standard practice has been 
developed by states, even as to whether such agreements should be published. The OECD 
Manual on MAP now encourages publication ‘unless the nature of the agreement (e.g. 
certain compliance-related agreements involving procedures for criminal cases) means that 
its publication would undermine its administrative goal’, and subject to maintaining taxpayer 
confidentiality (OECD-CTPA 2007: 10). It also gives two examples of such agreements, both 
in 2005: a Memorandum of Understanding between the US and Japan clarifying the meaning 
of the term ‘investment bank’ in the interest article, and a Mutual Agreement between the US 
and Mexico on the criteria and procedures for giving treaty benefits to fiscally transparent 
entities (OECD-CTPA 2007: 10). Nevertheless, such examples remain rare.  
 
In view of the extensive changes resulting from the BEPS project, and especially its intended 
aim of ending double non-taxation, it might have been expected that Action 14 would 
recommend a more important role for interpretive mutual agreements. Regrettably, the report 
on Action 14 was almost entirely concerned with resolving claims of double taxation, and did 
not discuss whether and how the MAP could be used to help ensure coordinated 
interpretation especially of the new treaty provisions resulting from the BEPS project. 
However, it did make one ‘best practice’ recommendation on this point, urging countries to 
establish arrangements for publication of ‘mutual agreements which relate to general matters 
that affect the application of a treaty to all taxpayers or to a category of taxpayers’, subject to 
agreement of both CAs and safeguarding taxpayer confidentiality (OECD 2015a: 29). 
 
1.2.2 Individual cases and the BEPS project proposals 
 
Both the model treaties also provide a right for a taxpayer to present a case to the competent 
authority of the state where it is a resident, if it considers that the actions of either state 
‘result or will result’ in taxation contrary to the convention (Article 25.1). However, the claim 
can only proceed if the CA considers it justified, in which case it can resolve the claim itself. If 
it is unable to arrive at a satisfactory solution, it must endeavour to resolve it by mutual 
agreement with the other CA (Article 25.2).  
 
This right is clearly stated to apply ‘irrespective of the remedies provided by the domestic law 
of those states’. Where such a treaty provision applies, therefore, taxpayers have an 
alternative and additional option to the normal procedures under domestic law. This again 
may in some countries create problems of possible conflicts between the role of domestic 
courts in applying tax treaty provisions as part of national law, and the right given to 
taxpayers to seek the alternative remedy. However, most CAs require taxpayers to choose, 
and suspend pursuit of legal remedies before initiating the MAP.15 
 
The MAP is essentially an administrative procedure, authorising tax officials to negotiate 
directly at the international level without going through diplomatic channels.16 While 
government officials may have some scope to interpret the law, it is usually a limited one. 
The MAP is treated by tax authorities as part of their administrative dealings with taxpayers. 
Hence, strong confidentiality protections are applied, and almost nothing is revealed 
publically about MAP cases – not even their existence, let alone the parties or issues 
involved.17 
                                                 
15  As stated in the OECD Commentary to Article 25 (para. 76). Equally, once a court or tribunal has decided a question, it 
is not generally possible to initiate the MAP in that state, but it can, of course, be done in the other state.  
16  For a wider discussion of international regulatory networks of this type see Picciotto (2011: ch. 3.2.5). 
17  The US has published some statistics since the 1970s, and some other countries more irregularly. For the past decade 
or so the OECD has begun to collect some data, while the European Commission has collected data on cases under 
the Arbitration Convention, included in reports to its Joint Transfer Pricing Forum. See Appendix for compilations from 
some of these sources. The issue is discussed among practitioners at meetings and conferences, especially of the 
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There is no obligation to reach an agreed outcome through the MAP under Article 25, nor in 
general under other provisions of the treaties. An exception is in relation to deciding the 
residence of an individual: Article 4 of the models lays down successive tests, and then 
provides that if all of them fail ‘the competent authorities shall settle the question by mutual 
agreement’. No doubt such a firm obligation is easy to accept in this context since the treaty 
specifies clear criteria, and failure to resolve the issue could result in juridical, not economic, 
double taxation. In relation to legal entities (i.e. companies), the BEPS Action 6 report now 
recommends a new Article 4(3), which leaves it to the competent authorities to resolve cases 
of dual residence. This uses the non-binding term ‘shall endeavour’, but it provides that in the 
absence of an agreement the entity shall not be entitled to any relief or exemption under the 
treaty. This is an important innovation, as it recognises that differing interpretations need not 
be resolved if the result is double non-taxation. 
 
The initial requirement that a MAP claim can only proceed if accepted as justified obviously 
creates an obstacle for the taxpayer. Access to the MAP procedure depends on whether the 
country accepts18 that the claim presents a case of ‘taxation not in accordance with the 
provisions of [the] Convention’.19 In relation to economic double taxation, the model treaties 
include an obligation in paragraph 9(2) that if one state has made a transfer pricing 
adjustment in accordance with the arm’s length principle of Article 9(1), the other state shall 
make an appropriate corresponding adjustment. However, many states do not accept Article 
9(2), so it is often omitted in treaties. In its absence, some states have taken the view that 
there is no obligation either to make a corresponding adjustment, or to admit claims to 
access the MAP resulting from another state’s transfer price adjustment. 
  
The minimum standard put forward in the BEPS Action 14 report (OECD 2015a) requires 
states to accept the MAP procedure and to implement its outcomes, as provided for in the 
OECD model and as interpreted by its Commentary. There is still some continuing reluctance 
by states to grant automatic access to the MAP and to guarantee implementation of its 
outcomes, particularly in economic double taxation cases. The report states that in general 
such taxation is not in accordance with the object and purpose of the convention, and ‘will 
likely’ frustrate it (OECD 2015a: para. 11). Hence, it is intended as part of the next revision to 
the Commentary to the Convention, to clarify ‘the circumstances in which a Contracting State 
may deny access to the mutual agreement procedure’ (OECD 2015a: para. 17).20 These 
changes may be included in the proposed multilateral instrument that will facilitate 
implementation of the treaty changes resulting from the BEPS project. 
 
These guarded statements are reinforced by inclusion of a best practice recommendation 
(OECD 2015a: para. 43) that states should include Article 9(2) in their treaties. Nevertheless, 
under the current interpretation of this paragraph in the Commentaries, it does not create an 
obligation to make a corresponding adjustment automatically. The requirement is to do so 
only if the state accepts that the initial adjustment was in accordance with the treaty ‘both in 
principle and as regards the amount’.21 This is the allocation issue that the MAP procedure 
                                                                                                                                                        
International Fiscal Association, which is a source of some information. Altman (2005, ch.2) provides a helpful survey 
and analysis of the data then available. 
18  This is generally a decision for the competent authority, although it may be possible under domestic law for a taxpayer 
to bring a case to require reference of a claim to the MAP: Altman cites three such cases, one in the US that was 
rejected, one in Israel that was successful, and one in Germany, where the court decided not to compel the claim to go 
forward because it would be unlikely to succeed (Altman 2005: 253, fn. 896; see also Hadari 2009: 6-7). 
19  This may even include cases where there is no double taxation, e.g. if one state may be taxing contrary to the treaty but 
the income would be exempt in the other state; or if the effect of a transfer price adjustment is to reduce tax losses. 
Hence, many treaties limit the MAP to the relief of double taxation. 
20  It also proposes (OECD 2015a: 22) that all countries should either ensure that all claims can be made to either 
competent authority (by changing the model treaty), or adopt (by changes to the Commentary) a bilateral notification 
and consultation process for cases considered to be unjustified. 
21  This phrase is used in the Commentaries to both Articles 7 (attribution of profits to a PE) and 9 (2014 edition of the 
OECD Model Convention: 148 and 184).  
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should resolve, and there is still no firm obligation automatically to refer cases to the MAP, or 
to ensure that agreement is reached to resolve every one.  
 
The cautious attitude of tax authorities towards the MAP is understandable, especially in 
allocation cases. A claim under the MAP to the competent authority requires the 
reconsideration of a transfer pricing adjustment made in an examination by specialist staff 
applying the internationally approved standards as they interpret them.22 Transfer pricing 
audits require highly skilled staff, and providing for review of such decisions by a separate 
group of CA staff puts a further stress on scarce skilled resources. Tax authorities have been 
reluctant to provide a guarantee to resolve any claimed conflict resulting from separate 
judgements by each tax authority of the appropriate level of profit to be attributed to an entity 
within their jurisdiction. A re-evaluation of these judgements implies consideration of the 
relative profits attributed to related entities, which runs counter to the independent entity 
principle. Finally, providing such a guarantee would remove much of the downside risk from 
transfer pricing strategies, while leaving the upside benefits of such strategies untouched. 
  
1.2.3 Emergence and rise of MAP cases 
 
The growth of individual cases under the MAP is relatively recent, and has occurred mainly 
among OECD countries. It seems to have resulted mainly from the increased formalisation 
and more rigorous application especially of transfer pricing rules, as well as the greater 
sophistication of the techniques devised for TNCs to exploit them. Until recently tax 
authorities adopted a very cautious attitude to the MAP, and companies also have preferred, 
if possible, not to resort to the procedure, at least in cases involving economic double 
taxation. It was estimated that only a small proportion of transfer pricing adjustments resulted 
in a MAP claim, perhaps some 10 per cent (Altman 2005: 118).23 Commentators such as 
Altman considered this a low proportion, and infer that the MAP was under-used because it 
was unsatisfactory. However, this gives insufficient weight to the reasons why it might be 
undesirable, unavailable or unnecessary.  
 
First, the TNC might decide not to contest an adjustment either in the courts or by requesting 
a MAP if it accepts the adjustment as legitimate, or at least acceptable. Secondly, many 
adjustments are likely to be in relation to affiliates in low- or zero-tax countries with which 
there may be no treaty, so the MAP is not available. Thirdly, whether or not it accepts the 
decision, the TNC may be able to deal with the consequences through self-help (Cole and 
Maher 2012). For example, the accounts of the related company can be adjusted if they have 
not yet been submitted; a corresponding adjustment may be requested; or it may be possible 
to claim a credit for the additional foreign taxes paid due to the adjustment. Such expedients 
are likely to be considered preferable to embarking on a more formal procedure which, 
although usually less costly than a legal case, would invite closer examination of the 
taxpayers’ accounts.  
 
However, such opportunities for self-help have been reduced as states have formalised their 
procedures for transfer pricing, and for corresponding adjustments consequent to a transfer 
pricing audit by another state. Recourse in individual cases began to be significant only after 
1970, when the US adopted procedures for using the MAP to resolve transfer pricing 
conflicts following the introduction by the US of the first transfer pricing regulations in 1968. 
Use of the procedure with US treaty partners was then greatly boosted by US regulations of 
1976 denying a US tax credit for foreign taxes unless all practicable administrative and legal 
remedies had been pursued with the treaty partner, including a MAP claim. The effect of this 
rule is to require a MAP claim whenever an adjustment is made affecting an affiliate of a US 
                                                 
22  See comments by Carol Dunahoo, who was the US Competent Authority 2000-2003, in Bell (2004: 272).  
23  Based on US data; a more comprehensive estimate is not possible, since few countries issue data on the number of 
transfer price adjustments.  
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TNC in a US treaty partner, unless the foreign adjustment is clearly in line with US 
standards.24 Other states have followed suit, which is likely to have contributed to the growth 
of MAP claims.25 Another factor, which seems to have come into play especially in recent 
years, is that some adjustments have involved very large amounts. Some involve tens or 
even hundreds of millions of dollars, which is clearly too significant to deal with by other 
means.26  
 
By the 1980s, dissatisfaction began to grow from TNCs or their tax advisers. Their main 
concerns were that: the MAP did not guarantee to eliminate double taxation; cases could 
take a long time; they were not necessarily given an opportunity to present their case; and 
cases were not necessarily considered on their individual merits but negotiated as a package 
deal. The solution proposed was that if cases could not be resolved for a specified period, 
they should be referred to binding arbitration. However, when the OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs first reviewed these arguments it firmly rejected them (OECD 1984). It found 
that although the MAP was ‘less than perfect’, it was an ‘efficient and flexible instrument’; 
cases were relatively infrequent, although admittedly regulation of transfer pricing was quite 
recent, so the fears of increased conflicts should not be exaggerated. To guarantee 
elimination of double taxation could make transfer pricing manipulation riskless, and it was 
not clear whether arbitrators would be expected to decide on a pragmatic or principled basis. 
Instead, it recommended some improvements to the MAP. 
 
There was nevertheless a continued growth in MAP cases. The OECD began to collect data 
a decade ago, and these show that cases have more than doubled in that time to around 
2,000 per year (making some allowance for double counting), with the backlog growing 
slightly faster (see Appendix). Responses to the regular surveys by Big Four firm Ernst & 
Young indicate that between 2003 and 2010 only some 18 per cent of the 877 companies 
responding had referred a case to the MAP in the previous four years (Ernst & Young 2010: 
12), but by time of the 2013 report (Ernst & Young 2013) this had grown to 28 per cent (in 
2010-2012). At the same time, it is important to note that these surveys also indicate that 
TNCs are even less likely to have recourse to domestic litigation than to use the MAP.  
 
Much of this growth is likely to be due to the introduction or strengthening of transfer pricing 
enforcement, especially when based on the OECD methods. Another likely factor is the 
greater sophistication of tax planning techniques, going beyond the use of classic tax 
havens. Since these generally do not have tax treaties, the MAP is not available with them. 
TNCs have since the 1990s increasingly resorted to tax-driven restructuring, fragmenting 
their operations and supply chains, so that affiliates in high-tax countries are deemed to 
assume low risks and must pay royalties for intangibles, and hence earn low or no profits 
under OECD rules. OECD countries such as Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have 
offered facilities designed to facilitate such structures, and others have followed suit with 
schemes such as the ‘patent box’. This has put greater strain on the OECD transfer pricing 
rules, which rely on subjective judgements about the value attributed to different functions. 
 
The bulk of MAP cases have occurred among the main OECD countries, and so far little use 
has been made of the procedure in developing countries. A significant exception is India, 
which introduced transfer pricing regulations based on the OECD Guidelines in 2001. Their 
enforcement led to a rapid rise in disputes, many due to the subjective nature of the 
                                                 
24  This applies whether the additional foreign tax results from an adjustment by the foreign authority or by the US IRS, see 
Cole and Maher (2012: 72).  
25  The UK guidelines for MAP state that such a unilateral adjustment reducing a UK tax liability is unacceptable (HMRC 
2011: para. 52). 
26  The UK’s HMRC have reported the yield from transfer pricing inquiries over five years as varying between £436 million 
and £1,595 million: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/transfer-pricing-statistics-2013-to-2014/transfer-
pricing-statistics-2013-to-2014>. The report in 2012 mentioned that fluctuations from year to year are ‘principally due to 
the effects of a small number of very large cases’. 
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judgements involved in applying the arm’s length principle (Vijayaraghavan 2012). It is 
estimated that by 2007-8, after seven years’ enforcement, adjustments worth a total of $16 
billion had been made, with $9 billion in that year alone, resulting in a backlog of 3,000 cases 
in the tax tribunals by 2012 (Supekar and Dhadphale 2012); they are now estimated at 
double that number.  
 
India does not publish data on its MAP cases. However, a conflict is reported to have erupted 
between the Indian and US officials responsible for the MAP, leading to the replacement in 
July 2013 of the Indian official (Parillo 2013).27 Following the election of a new government 
with a more favourable policy towards foreign investors, in January 2015 the US and Indian 
CAs signed a Framework Agreement under the MAP procedure. This agreement had the 
stated aim of facilitating resolution of some 200 conflicts relating to the information 
technology sector, and a year later it was reported that about half had been resolved.28  
 
In contrast, Brazil has experienced few, if any, claims despite, or more likely because of, the 
fact that it applies a system of fixed margins for transfer pricing, regarded as unorthodox by 
the OECD. Argentina does not yet have a procedure for invoking the MAP (Grondona 
forthcoming), but China has seen a recent growth in cases according to data reported to the 
OECD (see Appendix, Table 1). 
 
Now many have expressed the concern that, as developing countries have also been 
strengthening the enforcement of international tax rules, especially on transfer pricing, there 
will be a further increase in conflicts (OECD 2015b). Indeed Jeffrey Owens, the former head 
of tax at the OECD, has been quoted as forecasting a ‘tsunami of disputes’ (Kollman et al. 
2015: 1190). Although at present developing countries have had very few MAP cases, they 
are beginning to emerge,29 and may increase, especially if those countries adopt 
interpretations that may be considered unorthodox.  
 
1.2.4 The introduction of arbitration 
 
Despite the views in the 1984 report, by 1990 some OECD states began to introduce 
arbitration procedures.30 This occurred in some bilateral tax treaties, and notably among EU 
member states in a multilateral Convention agreed in 1990, which came into force in 1995. It 
should be noted that this covers only disputes relating to attribution of income, and not other 
treaty interpretation issues.31 The OECD model convention was revised in 2007 to include 
arbitration, and the revised UN model issued in 2011 included an alternative version B of 
Article 25 with an arbitration provision a little different from that of the OECD. There has been 
a rapid spread of treaties including different versions, mainly of the OECD model (for a 
detailed comparison see Pit (2014)). A recent count by Martin Hearson found some 205 (see 
                                                 
27  The US data (Appendix Table 4) show a big jump in MAP requests due to foreign-initiated adjustments in 2013, and a 
growing backlog, some of which is likely to be due to cases with India. 
28  See <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=135867>. 
29  Notably, two MAP claims have been made as a result of assessments made by the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), 
which were discussed in a recent professional conference, but the sources cannot be quoted. Both involve 
telecommunications companies. Although the details cannot be verified, a MAP claim appears to have been made in 
South Africa by MTN, due to disallowance by the URA of management fees paid to an affiliate formed in Mauritius but 
claiming residence in South Africa. The other claim resulted from the application of capital gains taxes to the acquisition 
of Zain by Bharti (Airtel); the Uganda High Court decided in September 2014 that Uganda had jurisdiction to tax the 
transaction; the issue is still under consideration by the URA, but Bharti has brought an MAP claim in the Netherlands, 
where the share transfer took place. Uganda’s tax treaty with South Africa of 2001 does not provide for arbitration, but 
that with the Netherlands of 2004 does, at the request of either tax authority, if an MAP claim has not been resolved 
within two years. The MTN dispute involves $200 million, that with Zain $85 million - considerable sums, especially for a 
poor country. The similar high-profile conflicts involving Uganda and oil firms Tullow and Heritage did not result in MAP 
claims, since the transfers took place in countries without tax treaties; however, claims were made under BITs (Finance 
Uncovered 2015; Mbanga 2015). 
30  Various alternatives have been formulated, especially as regards the degree of compulsion, which will be analysed 
below. 
31  For a detailed analysis, see Pit (2015). 
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Appendix, Table 8), negotiated especially by countries which aim to offer ‘treaty shopping’ 
facilities, and including a number with developing countries (Hearson 2015). 
 
The common feature of all these arrangements is that arbitration does not replace the MAP 
but aims to supplement it, essentially as a spur to ensure resolution of cases by agreement 
between the CAs. Under all versions of the procedure the CAs must first attempt to resolve 
the conflict by agreement, and reference to arbitration occurs only if they fail to do so within a 
specified period. Usually this is two years, although the UN model has three years, and in 
several versions the CAs may by agreement extend it. Indeed, in some versions their 
consent is required for a case to be referred, in which case, of course, arbitration is not 
mandatory. In addition, all versions apply the same strict secrecy to the arbitration as to the 
MAP. Some, especially the EU convention, allow publication of the award, provided that it is 
agreed by both the parties and the taxpayer – but this has never occurred.  
 
The procedures differ mainly on how and by whom a reference to arbitration takes place, and 
hence to what extent and in what way it is mandatory. A reference may require: (i) the 
agreement of both CAs; (ii) a request by either CA (the UN model); (iii) a request by the 
taxpayer (the OECD model); or (iv) can be automatic if the CAs have failed to resolve the 
case within a specified period (in the EU Convention, after 2 years). The consent of the 
taxpayer may be added to the other requirements – indeed, in the current US model the 
taxpayer can end the procedure at any stage. For some – for example, almost all UK treaties 
– the taxpayer can reject the MAP decision and rely on domestic law (Pit 2015: 92; HMRC 
2011: para. 22). 
 
The other common feature is that very few arbitrations have actually taken place. This can be 
attributed to the reluctance of states to submit such cases to external decision. This is most 
evident where arbitration requires agreement of both CAs, hence in effect is not mandatory. 
Several experienced commentators have said that this is hardly surprising, since if the CAs 
have failed to reach agreement it would be because neither is willing to compromise, so they 
would be unlikely to agree to accept a third party’s decision.32 Even under the EU 
Convention, which mandates reference to arbitration if the CAs have failed to agree within 
two years, there have been at most half a dozen known arbitrations in twenty years.33 The 
rarity of reference to arbitration has indeed been praised as the merit of the procedure, on 
the grounds that its success is seen in the pressure placed on the CAs to reach agreement.34  
 
Building on this experience the US has adopted a new model,35 which has now emerged with 
considerable support in the international tax community – although less so among academic 
commentators, at least outside the US (see Altman 2005: 427, Pit 2015: 16, OECD 2015b). 
This has three main features (Brown 2015). First, it lays down a strict timetable: the 
arbitration procedure must begin no later than two years after the case commenced, and its 
timetable ensures completion within one more year. Secondly, the arbitrators do not give 
their own independent opinion, but must choose between the last best offers tabled by the 
state parties.36 This is made explicit in the US model treaty provision: 
                                                 
32  See Brown (2015), and Dunahoo, in Bell (2004); Lodin (2014) reports that in his experience as a member of two arbitral 
commissions under the EU convention, and that of others to whom he has spoken, they have never seen any sign of 
willingness to compromise from the tax authorities. 
33  Lodin, who has been involved in two, states that there have been five (Lodin 2014). The experience of the first one, 
between France and Italy concerning Electrolux, was reported to and discussed in the EU’s Joint Transfer Pricing 
Forum and elsewhere; the procedure apparently took 18 months due to logistical problems and its costs were 
disproportionate to the sums at issue (Pit 2015: 19; D’Alessandro 2009: 1160). 
34  See the arguments put forward by UN Committee members in favour of arbitration, included in the Commentaries to the 
2011 Model: 369. 
35  Negotiated mainly with Canada, although actually implemented first in the protocol of 2006 with Germany (Brown 2015); 
this amended the US-German treaty of 1989, which itself was the first modern bilateral treaty to include arbitration, 
although with the voluntary version. 
36  Also described as ‘baseball arbitration’, because it is sometimes used for deciding salaries for major league baseball 
players in the US. 
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The determination reached by the arbitration panel in the arbitration proceeding shall 
be limited to one of the proposed resolutions for the case submitted by one of the 
competent authorities of the Contracting States for each adjustment or similar issue 
and any threshold questions, and shall not include a rationale or any other 
explanation of the determination. The determination of the arbitration panel shall have 
no precedential value with respect to the application of this Convention in any other 
case.37 
 
Thirdly, the decisions are not published – indeed, the entire procedure, including the 
existence of a case, is subject to strict confidentiality. Informed commentators suggest that 
perhaps ten or a dozen arbitrations have taken place in the nine years since the first such 
treaty, mainly between the US and Canada, and that the US has so far won all of them.38 
 
 
2  The MAP and international tax 
administration 
 
2.1 The rejection of adjudication 
 
The MAP is essentially an administrative procedure, and the addition of arbitration has not 
changed this. The main aim of introducing arbitration has been to reinforce the MAP by 
ensuring a guaranteed outcome, preferably to a strict timetable. There seems less support 
from either tax authorities or most tax advisers for a procedure for international resolution of 
tax treaty disputes by the principled decision of an independent adjudicator.  
 
The procedural models adopted for arbitration have few of the features of third party 
adjudication. This is explicitly so in the case of the model which appears to have been most 
successful and is currently most favoured – LBO arbitration. This requires no hearing or 
process of fact-finding as in judicial proceedings, and formally precludes the arbitrators from 
deciding on the basis of their own judgement. Some consider that the main advantage of this 
procedure is that it encourages the parties to seek a compromise, since if the conflict 
reaches the arbitrators they are likely to prefer the offer of the party which conceded most 
(Brown 2015); while others suggest that it deters the adoption of unorthodox positions likely 
to be rejected by arbitrators. All the models also exclude other features of adjudication: in 
particular there is no attempt to ensure that like cases are treated alike. Indeed, the aim is 
quite the contrary, as the procedure is entirely secret. This precludes reference to a previous 
case, although no doubt tax advisers may have knowledge of cases with which they have 
previously been involved on behalf of another client. The LBO procedure, in particular, is 
deliberately designed to avoid creating legal principles or precedent (Brown 2015). 
 
The EU convention procedure is a hybrid. Unresolved conflicts are referred to an advisory 
Commission, with an even number of ‘independent persons of standing’, but also including 
representatives of each CA – who are hardly independent arbiters. However, it allows the 
enterprises concerned to appear or be represented before the Commission, which suggests 
that the procedure is a hearing. It also provides for production of a reasoned Opinion, which 
may be published by agreement of both states involved as well as the taxpayer, but in 
practice this has never occurred. The CAs are then obliged within six months to take a 
decision that eliminates the double taxation. This need not necessarily follow the 
                                                 
37  US Model Income Tax Convention 2016, Article 25.9.j. 
38  See Rosenbloom in Lang and Owens (2015: 163), who gives a lower estimate; my own unverified information comes 
from off-the-record private discussions, and is included here only because of the dearth of better sources. 
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Commission’s Opinion, although such a deviation seems unlikely. A report from experts who 
have served as independent members of Commissions has recommended moving towards a 
more adjudicative model, by excluding national representatives from the decision stage and 
establishing publication as the norm (European Commission 2013).  
 
However, the Convention procedure is regarded as at best a limited success, not least 
because of the evident reluctance of the CAs to allow cases to reach the arbitrators. 
Consultations are now taking place on revision of the procedures. There seems likely to be 
an attempt to introduce at least the possibility of a US-style LBO procedure, perhaps as an 
option. Such a revision of the Convention would require a conference and agreement among 
all the state parties. However, the Commission may decide to initiate a new approach under 
European law rather than a separate convention. This would raise wider issues, since it 
could give jurisdiction to the European Court of Justice in the last instance. 
 
2.2 The role of expertise 
 
The main characteristic of the MAP is that it has been the preserve of a small and exclusive 
group of international tax specialists. This has been reinforced by the ‘revolving door’, which 
in a number of countries allows or even encourages movement between the public sector 
and private practice. As a result many former officials, some with experience as competent 
authorities, now practice with international tax firms, especially the Big Four, and 
international law firms such as Baker McKenzie. Arbitrators are also very likely to be drawn 
from this community. There are, of course, safeguards to prevent bias in any individual case, 
but the overall result is that the process takes place among a small group of like-thinking 
insiders. Indeed, it may be regarded as a strength of the system that there is such an 
epistemic community with shared technical expertise, on the basis of which consensus may 
be easier to achieve. Indeed, many of the proposals in the BEPS Action 14 report aim to 
reinforce this, calling for the CA to be independent from both policy and audit functions within 
the tax authority (recommendations 2.3 and 2.4), and proposing a strengthening of collective 
standards through the MAP Forum of the OECD Forum on Tax Administration.  
 
The difficulties and dangers of such a system should, however, also be clear. It places a 
premium on technical expertise, which requires considerable investment of social, cultural 
and intellectual capital. This makes it very hard for newcomers to break in to the charmed 
circle. The shared understanding of the members of such groups can become ossified and 
closed to different approaches. These are clearly disadvantages for developing countries. 
Further, the emphasis on technical factors aims to depoliticise decision-making, even in 
issues such as tax that inevitably affect the conditions of competition between business 
firms, and raise questions of fairness. Although a technical consensus can be strong it may 
also be fragile, especially when the assumptions underpinning it come under wider social 
and political pressure. This, perhaps, explains the need to protect the decisions not only 
behind the usual veil of technocratic discourse, but a dense cloak of secrecy.39 
 
All these problems have been apparent in the MAP, contributing to both the growth of 
conflicts and the increased difficulty in resolving them. They have become most acutely 
evident in the clash between the US and Indian tax authorities, although this appears to have 
been smoothed over (see Section 1.2.3 above). They also account for the resistance of 
many smaller states, and especially of developing countries, to accepting binding MAP, 
especially by arbitration. The community of experts is currently dominated by people from 
OECD countries, and although the expansion of arbitration would offer opportunities for 
newcomers, the price of entry will inevitably be their acceptance of the existing orthodoxy, 
even if it is unsuitable for developing countries. Such countries are nevertheless coming 
                                                 
39  For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Picciotto (2011, ch. 10.2) and Picciotto (2015). 
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under strong pressure to accept arbitration, notably in negotiation of bilateral treaties – a 
number of which now include arbitration provisions (Hearson 2015).  
 
2.3 The interaction with international trade and investment 
 
Although the emergence of arbitration in international tax has some similarities with other 
areas, such as trade disputes and investment arbitration, it differs in key respects.  
 
Unlike most trade and investment treaties, tax conventions are incorporated into national law 
and hence give enforceable legal rights to taxpayers. Hence, domestic courts apply tax treaty 
provisions and in doing so refer to the Commentaries to the model conventions, and often 
even to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, although they are only international ‘soft 
law’.40 The MAP provides an additional special remedy for taxpayers involved in international 
transactions, which may be pursued in parallel with domestic litigation. This creates 
difficulties, and some countries require a choice to be made – although this may cause its 
own problems. The problem is greater if international arbitration is introduced, and in many 
countries domestic litigation must be completed, suspended or abandoned before a case can 
proceed to arbitration.41 Such a requirement of exhaustion of local remedies is common for 
international claims but it is seen as contrary to the aims of the MAP, which seeks a rapid 
consensual solution. Yet to accord priority to international adjudication would be to allow it to 
override domestic law. Such concerns about sovereignty are central to the conundrum of 
international tax dispute settlement. 
 
Nevertheless, over the years some commentators have advocated the judicialisation of 
international tax disputes (e.g. Lindencrona and Mattsson 1981; Altman 2005; Kollmann et 
al. 2015). There has indeed been a shift towards the use of arbitration, although, as 
discussed in Section 2.1, in the tax field this has not taken a judicial form. Specialists in 
international trade or investment dispute resolution have also become interested in the 
possible opportunities in the tax field. This includes some connected with bodies such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA),42 with a 
long history of providing arbitration of international business issues. Both trade and 
investment dispute settlement procedures have become judicialised in the past twenty years, 
although in different ways, and in both cases this occurred after a long period of being dealt 
with through primarily political or diplomatic procedures (Picciotto 2011: chs. 5.2 and 8.3). 
 
Indeed there are overlaps, since some tax measures may be contrary to provisions in 
international trade or investment agreements. In such cases, a tax question may be referred 
to the more judicialised procedures now available under such conventions. A significant 
number of such cases have indeed arisen. An early example was the long-running dispute, 
from 1971 to 1999, over US tax exemptions on income from export sales, which were the 
subject of complaints by European states under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The US Treasury, which led the advocacy on the US side, counterclaimed that the 
more general exemption of foreign income by many European states also constituted an 
                                                 
40  In the UK, under the TIOPA, see Footnote 9 above. Similar provisions have been made more recently in anglophone 
African countries, such as Nigeria and Tanzania (even though they are not OECD members): see Tanzania Income Tax 
(Transfer Pricing) Regulations 2014 s.9. In Kenya, the High Court allowed an appeal against a tax adjustment by 
Unilever relying on the Guidelines, even though they were at that time not mentioned anywhere in Kenyan law. ‘We live 
in what is now referred to as a “global village”. We cannot overlook or sideline what has come out of the collective 
wisdom of tax payers and tax collectors in other countries. And especially because of the absence of any such 
guidelines in Kenya, we must look elsewhere’ (Judge Alnashir Visram, Unilever Kenya v. KRA 2005, 12). A Malaysian 
court has upheld a transfer pricing method based on the Guidelines, rejecting an adjustment made by the tax authority 
under local law, which it held to be invalid MM Sdn Berhad v Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri Appeal No PKCP(R) 
55/2009 (2013) MSTC ~10-046 (2013). 
41  See EU Convention, Article 7.3, which allows this if the domestic law of the state does not permit the CA to derogate 
from the decision of its judicial bodies. 
42  Indeed, the PCA has moved with alacrity to establish TRIBUTE, a facility offering a range of procedures to help resolve 
international tax disputes <http://www.tribute-arbitration.org/>. 
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export subsidy, insisting that both cases should be heard by the same GATT Panel, and that 
it should include a tax expert. These tactics partly succeeded, in that the GATT Panel 
balanced its finding against the US with a rather elliptically-worded ruling against the 
European measures also (Hudec 1993: 82-3). This led to a compromise under which both 
reports were accepted subject to an ambiguous `understanding’ (ibid. 91-2). This simply 
sowed the seed for a subsequent renewal of the disputes under the GATT’s successor, the 
WTO.43  
 
Unsurprisingly, some consider it inappropriate for trade or investment rules to limit tax 
sovereignty (Samuels 2008). However, from the perspective of investment or trade law a 
blanket exclusion of tax issues is also inappropriate. A conflict with trade obligations is more 
likely to be caused by indirect taxes, indeed trade agreements such as the GATT explicitly 
apply to such taxes, and the GATT does not include any exclusion or carve-out for tax 
measures. However, as the GATT disputes show, direct tax regimes can also be considered 
to constitute trade subsidies or to involve discrimination. This becomes more acute in relation 
to trade in services. Hence, trade rules need to be taken into account when formulating tax 
policies, notably in considering cross-border taxation of digital sales.44  
 
This tension was played out in the negotiation of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) in the WTO package of agreements. Taking place soon after the disputes 
under the GATT, as well as other tax conflicts between the US and European states, the 
result was the inclusion of carve-outs for tax measures in the GATS.45 Similar complex 
provisions have now been been included in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Herzfeld 2016), 
and the draft Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement. Such 
provisions governing the interaction of these regimes attempt to prevent normal international 
tax issues from being decided in other forums, but they are not completely excluded. There is 
a long history of state actions directed at foreign investors taking the form of taxation 
measures, which have been treated as indirect expropriation, and some argue that this has 
become a more acute problem with the expansion of the regulatory state (Wälde and Kolo 
2008). In addition, the very broad nature of the non-discrimination provisions in investment 
agreements can create opportunities for legal arguments that may be unexpected, unless 
specific exclusions are inserted.46 Since many such agreements include an investor-state 
dispute settlement procedure, they provide a possible avenue for TNCs to make a direct 
claim for arbitration of a tax-related complaint.  
 
To manage this interaction, many BITs include a procedural mechanism which acts as a filter 
to exclude tax-treaty related issues. This requires a claimant asserting that a tax measure is 
in breach of investor protection provisions to first notify the competent tax authorities of both 
states concerned. The claim cannot proceed if those competent authorities agree, within a 
specified time limit (usually six or nine months), that the tax measure does not fall within the 
investor protection provisions. Such a provision is included in the US model BIT, and in many 
actual BITs of the US and other states, as well as some multilateral agreements.47 The US 
model BIT also specifies that the taxation measures are covered only by the investment 
                                                 
43  See McDaniel (2001), Slemrod and Avi-Yonah (2002) and Herdin-Winter and Hofbauer (2006). For an analysis of the 
shift towards judicialisation of trade dispute resolution, see Picciotto (2005). 
44  This option is discussed in the report on BEPS Action 1, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, which 
points out that destination-based sales taxes are favoured by trade rules (OECD 2015c: 30); it also points out that 
imposition of a withholding tax on payments to foreign suppliers for cross-border sales would conflict with trade rules 
(OECD 2015c:115). 
45  Discussed by several of those involved in the negotiation in a Panel at the annual meeting of the American Society of 
International Law in 2008 (Samuels 2008). 
46  The European Commission included a provision (Article 2.4) in its negotiating draft for the TTIP which would exclude 
decisions on state aid from the definition of investment measures. The US has complained that the use by the 
Commission of its powers under state aid provisions to attack tax transfer pricing rulings made by some EU states such 
as Ireland and Luxembourg is discriminatory against US-based TNCs. 
47  Kolo (2008). Other BITs do not include the procedural filter, notably those of The Netherlands, which provide only that 
the non-discrimination obligations of the BIT do not extend to advantages granted under a tax treaty. 
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measures concerning expropriation and performance requirements, and that in case of an 
inconsistency tax treaty provisions override those of a BIT, and the competent tax authorities 
have sole responsibility for deciding whether there is an inconsistency. 
 
Hence, some tax-related cases have been brought under investment agreements. They 
especially concern claims of discriminatory or retroactive taxation, and windfall or capital 
gains taxes particularly in extractive industries (Wälde and Kolo 2008; Sidhu 2014; 
Transnational Institute 2016). The most egregious example has been the long-running 
dispute concerning the seizure by Russia of the Yukos Oil Corporation, allegedly for tax 
evasion. This resulted in several claims, mainly under the Energy Charter Treaty, with a final 
award covering three claims in 2014 (Yukos Claims 2014). Claims under BITs have included 
Heritage Oil against Uganda, and still pending claims by Vodafone and Cairn Energy against 
India, all relating to capital gains taxes, and in the Indian cases focusing on retroactivity. 
Also, a WTO Panel in 2015 accepted some of the complaints by Panama under the GATS 
against Argentina’s regime for blacklisting non-cooperating tax jurisdictions.48  
 
The availability of adjudication through parallel regimes may act as a spur for more 
formalised, or at least more effective, dispute settlement for tax conflicts. However, a shift 
towards more formal adjudication of international tax disputes would further complicate these 
interactions. Some concerns have been expressed about the tendencies to fragmentation of 
international law due to the rise of different but overlapping global regimes. Nevertheless, 
pluralism, or more pejoratively turf wars, is likely to be a continuing feature (ILC 2006; Young 
2012).  
 
The experience of arbitration or adjudication in these related fields may have suggested to 
some that it could be extended also to tax, but it should be a salutary warning. The ISDS 
procedure under BITs can now fairly be described as in crisis. Developing countries in 
particular have reacted against the procedure, leading some, such as Indonesia and South 
Africa, to cancel many of their BITs, while Bolivia, Ecuador, Indonesia, and Venezuela have 
denounced the World Bank’s Convention for settlement of investment disputes. India issued 
a new model investment treaty in 2015 that considerably restricted investors’ rights, including 
the exclusion of all taxation measures, and in July 2016 moved to terminate or renegotiate 
existing treaties (Singh and Ilge 2016).  
 
Criticisms of the ISDS have mounted, focusing especially on the illegitimacy of arbitrators 
chosen ad hoc, some with conflicts of interest, adjudicating on public policy issues affecting 
substantial public revenue, often under a cloak of secrecy (UNCTAD 2015: 4). It is not hard 
to envisage that similar criticisms would be made of international tax arbitration. The WTO 
system has been much less attacked, no doubt because it is a much more transparent and 
clearly adjudicative procedure. There are clearly limits to how far conflicts between states 
involving sensitive areas of sovereignty can be dealt with by delegated powers through 
administrative action, especially where they concern powerful economic actors such as 
TNCs. 
 
 
3  The reform of international tax dispute 
resolution 
 
Too much of the current discussion treats arbitration as the solution, without first analysing 
the nature of the problem. Reform proposals should first address the causes and 
                                                 
48  Argentina - Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services WT/DS453/R; the decision is under appeal. 
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characteristics of international tax disputes, and then consider how to facilitate their 
resolution. Regrettably such an analysis can at present only be speculative, due to the 
almost complete lack of published data about the nature of the disputes referred to the MAP, 
and the reasons for the difficulties that CAs appear to experience in resolving them. 
Nevertheless, an attempt can be made to evaluate the proposals that have been made 
against the available evidence.  
 
Perhaps the most extensive set of reform proposals was put forward by Altman (2005). He 
proposed establishment of a Global Tax Organisation, which would supervise a reformed 
MAP process. Within this he suggested two types of adjudication: (i) an arbitration system for 
fact-intensive matters especially transfer pricing ‘allocation’ cases, which in his view should 
remain secret, and (ii) a full-blown International Tax Tribunal, especially for treaty 
interpretation issues, providing non-binding advisory opinions to national courts. These 
ambitious and sophisticated proposals are beyond what currently seems practical, but 
consideration of the reasoning behind them may be helpful.  
 
3.1 The institutional framework  
 
A global tax organisation could indeed provide a more legitimate framework for international 
tax administration, which could include dispute resolution. Despite several initiatives, 
attempts to create such a body have so far foundered.49 The OECD continues to be by far 
the best resourced body in this field, especially in relation to international tax treaties and 
their administration. It will now be open to all states through the Inclusive Framework for 
BEPS, which aims to recruit any state willing to become a BEPS Associate (OECD 2016). 
This entails a commitment to implement the minimum standards in the BEPS project 
package, which will be monitored through the classic OECD procedure of peer review. In 
exchange they can participate on an equal basis in the BEPS-related work of the Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs.50  
 
The minimum commitments include the recommendations from Action 14 to strengthen the 
MAP, compliance with which will be monitored through the OECD’s Forum on Tax 
Administration. The basic commitments are to include in all tax treaties paragraphs 1-3 of 
Article 25; to create a domestic procedure for complaints to the CA that complies with a 
number of specified standards; and to accept access to the MAP and implement resulting 
decisions. The best practice recommendations are also quite extensive, and some envisage 
changes to the treaty commentary. These include clarifications specifying the circumstances 
in which a complaint to the CA may be pursued in conjunction with a court case, including 
that the CA may accept a claim that has not been found justified by a court (OECD 2015a: 
33). Although this and other proposals are not part of the minimum standard but best 
practices, they will apparently be implemented by changes to the treaty model and 
commentaries.  
 
There will also be important further work on Article 25 and its commentary, including on the 
nature of the obligation to resolve conflicts (discussed below). This presumably will be done 
as part of the BEPS project, with the enlarged participation. It is claimed that all states will 
participate in the Inclusive Framework on an equal basis, although many developing 
countries will feel that they would remain marginal participants in a process initiated and 
dominated by OECD countries.51 They would presumably be obliged to enter reservations to 
                                                 
49  Notably Tanzi (1999), Zedillo (2001). The latter report resulted in a slight upgrading of the UN body from a Group of 
Experts to a Committee of Experts (since 2005). Attempts since then to upgrade the body further, notably at the UN 
conference on Finance for Development in Addis Ababa in June 2015, have failed, due to opposition from some key 
OECD countries. 
50  It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this development or its ramifications. 
51  The Inclusive Framework covers only the issues being dealt with in the BEPS project, and under OECD rules officials 
servicing the project must at present be nationals of OECD countries.  
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any changes to the OECD model or its commentaries with which they do not agree, like the 
OECD states.  
 
The UN Committee, with some 2 per cent of the resources of the OECD,52 will continue to 
play a valiant but minor role. It agreed in 2015 to create a subcommittee on dispute 
resolution, which may take a different, although complementary, perspective. However, the 
BEPS project has already resulted in changes to the OECD model treaty, and to its 
commentary. The intention is to introduce these rapidly into actual bilateral treaties through 
the proposed multilateral convention, which developing countries are also invited to join. It is 
not clear how far the UN Committee can continue to maintain any independence in its own 
work on the UN model treaty and commentary in relation to issues being dealt with under the 
BEPS project, including dispute resolution. This unsatisfactory institutional compromise 
creates a legitimacy deficit that is hard to overcome. The principled case for a global tax 
organisation seems overwhelming, but the practical and political obstacles to creating one 
are equally substantial. 
 
3.2 Arbitration or adjudication 
 
Altman proposed two types of third-party procedure: arbitration and adjudication. This rests 
on the distinction between ‘fact-intensive’ issues, which he suggests are suitable for 
arbitration, and treaty interpretation cases, which could be adjudicated. The role of arbitrators 
would therefore be as specialist experts capable of determinations on complex factual 
issues. This could also justify secrecy of the arbitration, on the grounds of the need to protect 
commercially confidential information. Altman justifies secrecy on the different grounds that 
publication would open up disputes to wider debate and politicise them, making them harder 
to resolve (Altman 2005: 424).  
 
However, it does not seem that the problem even in allocation cases is the difficulty of 
ascertaining or understanding complex facts. Such issues do arise, especially in profit 
allocation cases, but fact-finding will already have been done by specialist staff in the 
national tax administrations at the audit stage, and perhaps also by the CA. If the CAs have 
nevertheless failed to agree, it will be over the appropriate categorisation of the issue. In 
particular, in allocation cases the conflicts are likely to concern which transfer pricing method 
to use, and how to apply it. This may involve detailed technical issues, but they are not 
merely factual. Arbitration procedures in practice aim to avoid leaving it to arbitrators to 
conduct a fact-finding process, and indeed the LBO version precludes this. 
 
It seems clear that the problem lies rather with the difficulty of reaching agreement on the 
principles to be applied, and how to apply them. This is greatly exacerbated in allocation 
cases by the ad hoc nature of the functional analysis required, due to the independent entity 
principle. This approach means that the all-important issue of how to allocate the profits of a 
TNC is dealt with by a series of specific decisions on categorisation, which require ad hoc 
and relatively subjective judgements. Where the CAs disagree, they would understandably 
be reluctant to have the issue decided instead by the judgement of an independent third 
party. 
 
This appears to explain why the EU Convention’s more adjudicative model has been 
unsuccessful, while the US seems to have had more success in recent years in reducing its 
                                                 
52  The Secretary of the UN Committee, Michael Lennard, has frequently pointed out in public that he is that Committee’s 
only full-time professional staff member. Precise staff numbers of the OECD Centre on Tax Policy and Administration 
are not published. They vary according to the scope of work taken on, not all of which is directly related to the 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs; nevertheless, its staff can conservatively be estimated as over 50. 
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backlog of MAP cases.53 This seems attributable firstly to the introduction of LBO arbitration, 
and secondly to the rapid resolution of 100 cases with India under the framework agreement 
of January 2015. These successes do not seem to be due to the contribution of arbitrators in 
formulating and clarifying the appropriate principles to be applied in individual cases. The 
LBO method emphasises compromise. This is unlikely to take the form of simple bargaining 
over monetary amounts, but parties may make concessions over the applicable methodology 
with regard to the resulting monetary outcome. Similarly, the framework agreement was 
clearly not a package deal over dollar amounts, but will have established the methodology to 
be applied to the class or group of cases to be dealt with. Nevertheless, its aim was clearly to 
facilitate rapid processing of a large number of cases as a package, with both sides keenly 
aware of the likely monetary outcomes. As always, the concerns of tax authorities for 
government revenue will be tempered by wider considerations of finance ministries of the 
effects on foreign investment, reinforced by powerful business lobbies.  
 
On the other hand, treaty interpretation issues do seem more amenable to principled 
adjudication, as Altman suggests.54 In his schema, a full blown International Tax Tribunal 
would have permanent judges (rather than arbitrators chosen ad hoc), who could develop ‘a 
lex tributum, an international law for taxes’ (Altman 2005: 434). He also proposes that its 
decisions would not be binding, but only advisory opinions for national courts. This would 
overcome many of the sovereignty dilemmas, making it easier for governments to sign up to 
the scheme, as well as avoiding conflicts with national courts by enlisting them in a 
cooperative process (Altman 2005: 434). 
 
At present, however, CAs seem no more willing to refer this type of conflict to third parties 
than allocation cases. Nor do any of the main participants in the MAP support the shift to an 
adjudicative model such a proposal entails. A Tribunal would at a minimum be expected to 
formulate its decisions as reasoned opinions, and publish them. The EU Convention moved 
in this direction, by providing that the conclusions of its Commissions should take the form of 
a reasoned Opinion, which might be published. Yet both CAs and taxpayers involved in 
cases have not only rejected publication of Opinions but have continued to insist on complete 
secrecy, to the regret of some of the independent members of Commissions (Lodin 2014: 
174).  
 
A shift towards adjudication was also rejected in the consultations on BEPS Action 14 on 
making dispute resolutions more effective. The Discussion Draft on this action point included 
a proposal to add a new paragraph to the Commentary of Article 25 of the model treaty 
(OECD 2014: 6). This would clarify that the obligation in that Article for CAs to endeavour to 
resolve disputes would mean: 
 
that the competent authorities are obliged to seek to resolve the case in a principled, 
fair and objective manner, on its merits, in accordance with the terms of the 
Convention and applicable principles of international law. 
 
Comments on these proposals by some civil society organisations spelled out that 
formalising such a legal obligation would imply a judicialisation of the MAP. The submission 
to this consultation from the BEPS Monitoring Group commented on this proposal as follows. 
 
We agree with this objective, but suggest that the implications of these important 
criteria should be spelled out in more detail in the Commentary. In our view, they are 
as follows: 
                                                 
53  Appendix Tables 1a and 5 indicate that the US case backlog peaked in 2009, falling by 2012, then rising again (perhaps 
due to the increase of cases with India), but a rise again in 2015; while Table 6 shows a significant reduction of the 
overall processing time 2011-2014, and also a rise in 2015.  
54  It should also be borne in mind that cases may involve both types of question: e.g. in deciding whether there is a 
permanent establishment, a key issue is what profits should be allocated to it. 
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principled: this requires that outcomes should take the form of reasoned 
decisions, based on analysis of the facts of the case, the applicable rules and 
how they have been interpreted and applied to the specific case;  
fair: like cases should be treated alike, and decisions should be published, to 
ensure consistency; 
objective: decision-makers should be independent of the disputing parties and 
have no vested interests or conflicts of interest; and rules to be applied should 
be formulated so as to be easily applicable to specific cases based as far as 
possible on their facts rather than requiring value-judgements. 
 
The existing Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) in tax treaties is far from achieving 
this standard. At present it typically entails ad hoc agreements that have been kept 
secret among tax authority representatives and competent authority personnel. The 
only other privy parties are a small legion of tax advisers and the involved taxpayers. 
The inside knowledge they gain is a significant, and very inappropriate, commercial 
advantage for those tax advisers who may be involved frequently in such 
proceedings. 
(BMG 2015: 1) 
 
It also went on to spell out arguments for publication: 
 
Reasons for transparency perhaps need to be spelled out, since tax authorities are 
accustomed to maintaining strict confidentiality of the tax affairs of individual 
taxpayers. However, confidentiality does not usually extend to disputes which are 
referred to tax courts or tribunals, and in most countries these decisions are 
published. Secrecy is even less appropriate for international tax disputes. Firstly, 
such conflicts often involve very large sums, sometimes in the hundreds of millions or 
even billions of dollars. Few democratic countries would normally accept that 
decisions with such major implications should be taken behind closed doors by 
unaccountable officials. In cases unilaterally resolved or which are not accepted for 
MAP, the competent authority will have heard representations only from the tax 
authorities and the companies involved or their tax advisers. In bilateral MAP cases, 
the only additional parties involved are the other country’s competent authority and 
occasionally an arbitrator who has been sworn to secrecy. Even more importantly, 
secrecy greatly undermines all three of the criteria listed above. Publication provides 
the best incentive for the decision-makers to ensure that the outcome they reach is 
defensible in principle, rather than the result of an ad hoc bargain. It enables the 
reasons which are provided to be tested and evaluated through public debate. Both 
the published decisions and the debate around them can therefore contribute to a 
better general understanding of how the rules should be interpreted and applied. 
Creating such a wide and public understanding is crucial to ensuring that the way the 
principles are interpreted and actually applied is consistent and hence accepted as 
fair. Transparency of the whole process is central to ensuring that it can be seen to 
be impartial and objective. A final point, of course, is that knowledge of the bases on 
which decisions have been reached will help MNCs and other taxpayers plan their 
activities so as to be within the rules for multiple countries and avoid both double 
taxation and the need for MAP assistance to correct it. 
(BMG 2015: 2). 
 
The arguments for greater transparency were supported by a submission from Christian Aid, 
while Global Financial Integrity put forward proposals for a full-blown independent 
adjudication system (OECD 2015b: 135). However, there was a wide gulf between these 
views and those of the vast bulk of other commentators representing tax advisers and 
business, none of which favoured publication of decisions.  
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The final report on Action 14 no longer included the suggestion of clarifying the Article 25 
obligation to mean the resolution of cases ‘in a principled, fair and objective manner’. 
Instead, it stated that further work was needed to produce suitable wording in the treaty 
commentary. It refers to the need for decisions to be principled and fair only in relation to 
domestic CA procedures, and objectivity is not mentioned. Indeed, the bulk of both the 
minimum standards and the best practice recommendations are aimed at domestic 
procedures. Those concerning the MAP consist of a commitment to resolve cases within two 
years, to work together with others especially through the Forum on Tax Administration’s 
MAP Forum, which will organise the peer review of compliance with these standards, and to 
be transparent about the country’s position on arbitration.  
 
The Action 14 report does, however, include a best practice recommendation for publication 
of interpretive mutual agreements. This is in line with existing suggestions in the Manual on 
Effective Mutual Agreement Procedures (OECD-CTPA 2007), as mentioned above (Section 
1.2.1). The report states that this procedure ‘may be an effective tool to reinforce the 
consistent bilateral application of tax treaties’, and that further work will take place to clarify 
the legal status of such agreements. However, interpretation is essentially left to states. No 
explicit role seems to be envisaged for any multilateral body to consider divergences in 
interpretation, let alone to issue authoritative opinions on them. This seems surprising, in 
view of the concerns expressed by many that the BEPS reforms will lead to a period of 
uncertainty. The development of some form of multilateral interpretive agreement might 
provide a flexible procedure for adaptation of some of these complex reforms of international 
tax rules in the processes of implementation. 
 
The UN Committee considered the issue of arbitration at its meeting in October 2015, based 
on an introductory paper from the Secretariat (UN Tax Committee 2015). This paper focused 
only on ‘alternative dispute resolution’ (ADR), and aimed to widen the scope beyond 
mandatory binding arbitration to include mediation and conciliation, and other non-binding 
procedures. However, the aim of the paper seemed to be to smooth the way towards some 
form of third party decision-making: 
 
Other alternatives may also seek to ‘steer’ the parties towards a solution without 
giving a third party complete control of the steering wheel, and such approaches may 
have an important role in building confidence in tax ADR over time. When there is 
confidence in the third party driver as understanding and properly applying the rules, 
they may be given control of the steering wheel.  
(UN Tax Committee 2015: 15)  
 
The paper highlighted the differences between LBO arbitration and the more adjudicative 
model, which it termed ‘short form’ and ‘long form’ arbitration respectively. In weighing these 
alternatives, it evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of each, and the UN Committee 
decided to consider the issue more widely, by establishing a subcommittee on the MAP and 
Dispute Avoidance and Resolution. This reflected the views of many, especially from 
developing countries, that the focus should be on the problems of the MAP and their causes, 
rather than arbitration (Protto 2014). 
 
 
4  Conclusions  
 
It seems clear that the difficulties of the MAP are symptoms of a deeper malaise of the 
international tax system. Improvements in the dispute settlement procedures may, at best, 
provide a partial amelioration of the symptoms, but cannot cure the disease. The underlying 
causes of the problems centre on the lack of clear criteria for defining and allocating the tax 
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base of TNCs. This has resulted not only in the growth of conflicts between tax authorities, 
but also a lack of public confidence in the legitimacy of the system. 
 
These pressures led the G20 leaders to mandate the BEPS project to reform international 
tax rules to ensure that TNCs could be taxed ‘where economic activities occur and value is 
created’ (G20 2013: 4). The package of proposals released in September 2015 was far-
reaching, and provided strengthened powers to tax authorities able and willing to use them. 
Nevertheless, key issues remain unresolved, especially in relation to transfer pricing, and the 
tax challenges of the digital and service economy. There will be continuing work on these 
issues in the BEPS project, now with enlarged participation. At the same time countries have 
already begun introducing unilateral measures, such as the UK’s Diverted Profits Tax, and 
India’s proposed ‘equalisation levy’ on digital transactions. Although these are devised as far 
as possible to be compatible with their legal obligations, they will create increased tension.  
 
International tax rules therefore seem likely to remain uncertain, fluid and volatile, at least in 
the current period. Hence, it is easy to understand the pressure especially from business tax 
advisers for mandatory binding arbitration. However, it is clear that there is little support 
among most practitioners for the introduction of an adjudicative procedure. A few, mainly 
academics, favour some moves in that direction, such as reasoned opinions and greater 
institutionalisation of arbitration. However, there seems to be broad consensus among 
practitioners on the need for secrecy.  
 
The measures proposed for reforming the MAP seem aimed mainly at solidifying the distinct 
international tax expert community. Competent authority officials would be separated from 
front-line tax examination staff, to encourage them to give autonomous decisions under the 
CA procedure. The pressure to resolve cases quickly and by agreement will be increased, 
especially in countries accepting binding arbitration. Monitoring of the system through peer 
review aims further to strengthen acculturation to the norms of the specialist expert 
community. Yet the stress on the need for independence of the CA ignores the concerns 
about the frequent rotation of roles between public officials and private tax advisers.  
 
This approach would also place increasing strain on tax authorities that are already 
significantly under-resourced. International tax, and especially transfer pricing, demands 
highly trained staff who are scarce in any tax authority. Creation of a separate competent 
authority with the skills to review their decisions is hard to justify as cost-effective. There 
must also be concern that the intention is to delegitimise methodologies and interpretations 
of tax norms that are regarded as unorthodox or unacceptable to those dominant in the 
international tax community. Cloaking the procedures in secrecy will inevitably feed criticism 
that the intention is to close off debate about alternative perspectives. 
 
Above all, the continued maintenance of the blanket of secrecy over the procedure fatally 
undermines public confidence, which could threaten the whole tax treaty system. The 
controversy over the ISDS procedure for international investment arbitration has triggered 
wide concern, endangering negotiation of major agreements such as the TTIP. The tax treaty 
system is now also under challenge. A number of commentators have questioned its 
suitability, especially for host countries of TNCs (Baker 2014; Brooks and Krever 2015), and 
governments from Argentina to Uganda have been reviewing their treaty policies. The BEPS 
project had been intended to respond to such concerns and repair the system. Yet it seems 
hard to see how public confidence can be restored without a much higher level of 
transparency, including about the actual outcome of decisions allocating the profits of TNCs. 
 
A more effective remedy would be to reform international tax rules to make them clearer and 
easier to apply. This applies in particular to transfer pricing rules, which seem to be the main 
source of disputes referred to the MAP, and the most intractable cases. Such a reform 
should aim to allocate the profits of TNC groups based on clear and quantifiable factors 
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reflecting the actual economic activities and value created in each country. This would not 
only reduce the volume of conflicts, but also ensure that the disputes that do occur can be 
adjudicated in a transparent, fair and consistent manner.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 MAP cases for OECD countries and for OECD partner countries, 2006-14 
Table 1a: MAP cases in OECD member countries: number at the end of annual reporting periods 
Country  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Australia  16 23 22 23 27 21 21 23 18 
Austria  144 152 105 120 106 110 137 156 180 
Belgium  81 95 152 265 142 241 305 317 492 
Canada  134 153 186 206 225 225 222 235 257 
Chile  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Czech Rep.  13 13 4 8 13 14 16 21 26 
Denmark  82 82 79 86 67 57 55 57 72 
Estonia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 1 
Finland  12 22 20 22 32 37 50 103 103* 
France  254 233 328 427 490 539 551 618 549 
Germany  476 527 519 543 484 702 787 858 1029 
Greece  4 5 5* 5* 5* 27 30 30* 35 
Hungary  12 9 10 7 8 4 2 4 8 
Iceland  1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Ireland  4 6 7 13 16 17 22 26 25 
Israel N/A N/A N/A 13 13 14 17 18 17 
Italy  52 63 56 67 80 102 130 174 250 
Japan  67 85 82 90 75 61 70 65 77 
Korea Rep.  28 30 30 47 44 59 65 80 98 
Luxembourg  31 34 35 38 59 109 76 72 123 
Mexico  26 23 14 18 12 11 19 14 16 
Netherlands  120 151 127 118 97 99 140 123 198 
New Zealand  2 4 1 3 1 1 3 13 18 
Norway  25 32 42 51 52 44 36 49 48 
Poland  26 25 33 32 26 28 29 44 40 
Portugal  43 45 47 47 41 42 47 27 27 
Slovak Rep  1 4 5 6 7 9 9 15 14 
Slovenia N/A N/A 3 1 2 4 4 10 16 
Spain  55 109 66 76 84 87 82 79 78 
Sweden  94 100 125 103 134 163 198 183 186 
Switzerland  33 33 88 143 142 187 231 256 271 
Turkey  2 3 2 4 8 4 2 4 4 
UK  84 109 126 120 131 133 143 160 190 
USA  430 500 578 724 705 686 573 732 956 
Total 2235 2671 2897 3426 3328 3838 4073 4566 5423 
Table 1b: MAP cases in OECD partner countries: number at the end of annual reporting periods 
Argentina - - 2 3 3 3* 3* 3* 3* 
China# - - - - - - - 43 55 
Costa Rica## - - - - - - - - 1 
Latvia# - - - - - - - 0 0* 
South Africa - - 0 1 4 6 6 6 8 
Total - - 2 4 7 9 9 52 67 
NOTES 
MAP cases are reported separately by each country, so the totals include considerable double counting. 
* If a country did not report the number of outstanding cases at the end of a reporting period, the number of cases reported is 
that for the end of the preceding reporting period; if that number was not available, the number reported is that at the end of the 
subsequent reporting period (marked with an asterisk).  
# China and Latvia reported MAP statistics to the OECD for the first time for the 2013 reporting period 
## Costa Rica reported MAP statistics to the OECD for the first time for the 2014 reporting period 
Source: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/map-statistics-2014.htm> 
Table 2 Average completion time of MAP cases between OECD countries, 2006-14  
(for reporting countries, in months ) 
Average completion time of MAP cases between OECD countries 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
20.10 18.93 22.42 22.82 27.30 25.39 25.46 23.57 23.79 
Source: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/map-statistics-2014.htm> 
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Table 3 Number of new cases initiated in reporting period 2006-14 
Number of new cases initiated in reporting period 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Australia 9 13 8 19 21 10 10 8 10 
Austria 29 26 36 30 38 35 61 41 49 
Belgium 31 30 71 213 120 120 151 124 205 
Canada  76 70 85 103 101 94 87 127 127 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Czech Republic 5 10 5 6 8 12 13 7 12 
Denmark 15 18 21 22 20  24 24 22 43 
Estonia -- -- -- -- -- 0 0 0 1 
Finland 1 11 8 5 11 13 14 56 56* 
France 104 100 154 169 135 173 181 216 201 
Germany 212 186 177 177 150 306 277 267 374 
Greece 1 2 -- -- -- 5 3 3* 4 
Hungary  4 3 1 2 1 0 1 2 4 
Iceland 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 4 
Ireland 3 3 2 6 7 6 12 12 5 
Israel -- -- -- -- 4 9 5 3 3 
Italy 14 20 14 31 22 41 45 52 89 
Japan 37 49 40 44 34 22 31 36 45 
Korea 8 9 13 25 13 24 22 23 33 
Luxembourg 22 31 31 25 35 75 39 45 116 
Mexico 14 11 5 10 4 5 17 12 4 
Netherlands  80 57 -- 64 51 34 83 75 87 
New Zealand  4 5 2 6 4 4 3 14 28 
Norway  15 21 30 21 16 7 10 26 18 
Poland 11 7 19 14 7 9 5 19 18 
Portugal 10 7 5 14 17 15 17 6 11 
Slovak Republic 0 -- 1 1 3 4 1 2 2 
Slovenia -- -- 3 0 2 2 3 6 11 
Spain 18 67 24 24 24 18 36 25 33 
Sweden  72 61 104 64 104 111 100 65 91 
Switzerland  -- 45 99 119 65 112 120 131 109 
Turkey 0 2 1 3 4 0 0 2 2 
United Kingdom -- 55 44 56 68 54 69 79 117 
United States 240 257 308 326 252 279 236 403 354 
Total 1036 1176 1311 1599 1341 1624 1678 1910  2266 
Source: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/map-statistics-2014.htm> 
 
Figure 1 Growth of cases between OECD countries 
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Table 4 US MAP cases received 2010-15 
 US initiated adjustments  Foreign initiated adjustments  Combined  
 Allocation Treaty Allocation Treaty Allocation Treaty 
2010 23  31  77  48  100  79  
2011 25  23  141  48  166  71  
2012 51  18  130  37  181  55  
2013 48  77  218  60  266  137  
2014 86  30  200  38  286  68  
2015 50 15 187 37 237 52 
 
Source: US Internal Revenue Service, Competent Authority Statistics (2015, 2016) 
Table 5 US pending MAP cases 2010-15 
 US initiated adjustments  Foreign initiated adjustments  Combined  
 Allocation Treaty Allocation Treaty Allocation Treaty 
2010 -  -  -    283  198  
2011  - - -    312  165  
2012  - -  -    403  170  
2013 91  91  433  118  524  209  
2014 126  89  592  149  718  238  
2015 152 75 603 168 755 243 
Source: US Internal Revenue Service, Competent Authority Statistics (2015, 2016) 
Table 6 US MAP cases average processing time 2010-15 (months) 
 US initiated adjustments  Foreign initiated adjustments  Combined  
 Allocation Treaty Allocation Treaty Allocation Treaty 
2010 25.6  28.4  30.8  24.4  29.7  25.9  
2011 28.2  25.0  27.8  29.0  27.9  27.2  
2012 23.1  24.5  26.6  18.9  26.0  21.0  
2013 23.8  18.4  26.9  20.0  26.1  19.2  
2014 15.0  14.3  25.3  30.2  21.4  19.8  
2015 27.7 28.9 32.7 17.8 32.1 23.3 
Source: US Internal Revenue Service, Competent Authority Statistics (2015, 2016) 
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Table 7 Cases under EU Convention 2014 
   Reasons why cases are still pending 2 years after initiation 
State Cases 
initiated 
in 2014 
Cases 
unresolved 
after 2 
years 
2-year 
point not 
reached 
due to 
CoC 
5(b)(i) 
Cases 
pending 
before 
court 
Time limit 
waived 
with 
taxpayer’s 
agreement 
To be 
sent to 
arbitration 
In 
arbitration 
Settlement 
agreed in 
principle, 
awaiting 
exchange 
of closing 
letters for 
MAP 
Other 
reasons 
Belgium 13 7 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 
Bulgaria  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Czech Rep.  5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark  17 10 0 1 9 0 0 0 0 
Germany*  129 137 6 26 2 0 0 15 88 
Estonia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland  1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Greece  4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain  38 35 0 10 2 0 0 8 15 
France  63 89 0 5 76 1 0 7 0 
Italy  86 107 4 32 9 1 0 0 61 
Cyprus  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Latvia  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg  0 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Hungary  2 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malta  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands  28 18 0 4 1 0 0 1 12 
Austria  12 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
Poland  6 13 4 0 0 0 0 1 8 
Portugal  7 16 3 3 0 0 0 0 10 
Romania  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovakia  3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland  36 14 2 7 0 0 0 0 5 
Sweden  18 29 0 5 23 0 0 1 0 
UK  35 20 1 3 0 0 0 0 16 
TOTAL  506 520 29 98 125 3 0 34 231 
Source: Statistics on Pending Mutual Agreement Procedures (MAPs) under the Arbitration Convention at the End of 2014, 
DOC: JTPF/008/2015/EN, reported to the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum meeting of October 2015 
Notes to Table 7 
States report their MAP claims separately, so for the number of bilateral cases the totals should be divided by two. [Information 
privately communicated by the European Commission]. 
 
* Remark by Germany: Please note that the German competent authority (CA) internal case database does currently not allow 
to record ‘initiated’ and ‘completed’ dates following OECD and Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (JTPF) definitions (see also the 
footnote below Table1). The figures provided here are based on the ‘initiated’ and ‘completed’ dates used for internal purposes. 
Under the definition applied by the German CA, a case is treated as open as soon as the German CA receives a request 
(regardless of whether it already contains the necessary minimum information or not, which is earlier than under the OECD and 
JTPF definition of ‘initiated’). The ‘completed’ standard used is now largely in line with OECD and JTPF guidance. The deviating 
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‘initiated’ definition results in a larger MAP case inventory and makes cases appear older than under OECD/JTPF definitions. 
This should be borne in mind when comparing the German 2014 figures with statistics provided by other countries. 
 
Of the 88 cases reported under ‘other reasons’, there are10 cases for which the application was received in 2012 and for which 
the 2-year period had not started yet in 2012 because the German CA requested additional information (2009 Code of Conduct 
point 5 (b) (ii)). In the remaining 78 cases, the 2-year period had indeed expired on 31/12/2014. In 12 of the cases, settlement 
appeared imminent at the end of the year, and was in fact reached in the meanwhile (i.e. before end of June 2015). In most of 
the other 66 cases, sending them to arbitration did not appear meaningful because there had not been an exchange of position 
papers yet. In roughly half of these cases, the German CA was either still waiting for the first position paper of the CA of the 
country where the primary adjustment had been made, or had received such first position paper only very recently. In other 
cases the German side (the CA and/or the local or regional office from which a state statement was expected) appeared mainly 
or partly responsible for the delay, generally due to resource issues (leaving staff who could not immediately be replaced, longer 
illnesses, etc.).  
 
Table 8 Tax treaties containing arbitration provisions 
 
Source: Hearson (2015)  
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Table 9 Tax treaties with developing countries containing arbitration provisions 
 
Source: Hearson (2015) 
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